Blockchain has received tremendous attention as a distributed platform to enhance the security of Internet of Things (IoT). The history of communications is stored in blockchain which introduces auditability. On the flip side, new privacy risks are introduced as the entire history of IoT device communication is exposed to participants. We study the likelihood of classifying IoT devices by analyzing the temporal patterns of their transactions, which to the best of our knowledge, is the first work of its kind. We apply machine learning algorithms on blockchain data to analyze the success rate of device classification. Our results demonstrate success rates over 90% in classifying devices. We propose three timestamp obfuscation methods, namely combining multiple packets into a single transaction, merging ledgers of multiple devices, and randomly delaying transactions, to reduce the success rate in classifying devices which reduce the classification success rates to as low as 24%.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) brings connectivity to everyday devices and enables a wide range of personalized services to end users. IoT comprises an ever increasing number of devices. Thus, it is of great importance for the operators of IoT installations, e.g., campus manager in a smart campus, to determine the type of devices connected to their site and ascertain that the devices are functioning normally. Device identification can also be used by network attackers to compromise user privacy by identifying activity patterns. Proposed IoT device identification approaches analyze real-time network traffic [7] , where the attackers must have physical access to the site.
Blockchain has attracted tremendous attention as a promising approach to mitigate security risks in IoT. Recent IoT security approaches based on blockchain [3] , [6] amplify the privacy risks of device classification, eliminating the need for real-time and site access, and thereby posing long-term privacy risks. The use of blockchain for recording IoT device transactions changes the design space for device classification due to the following reasons: i) Transactions are permanently stored in the blockchain which potentially creates a large database of historical interactions of devices.
ii) Blockchain transactions contain the PK as the identity of the involved entities and in the network layer uses broadcast IP as the destination address. This makes it impossible to identify users using the source and destination IP addresses.
iii) In blockchain any entity can attempt device identification given that all participants can read the blockchain independent of the physical location of the entities. However, in conventional IoT ecosystems such attempts requires physical access to the network site where the devices are located. In blockchain, only the transaction corresponding to communications between devices which contains the hash of the exchanged data can be accessed. The network layer packets are not stored in the blockchain, which in turn make it impossible for the identifier to identify a device based on such data.
In this paper, we study the possibility of device identification in IoT-based blockchain by analyzing the patterns of recorded transactions in the blockchain. To study the device classification problem, we rely on a smart home as a representative case study. We use the smart home traffic dataset available in [1] and populate a blockchain by generating transactions corresponding to device communications. We study the success rate of classification of the IoT devices, in terms of semantic type, based on transaction patterns. To protect against this attack, we propose multiple timestamp obfuscation methods, such as combining multiple packets into a transactions, merging ledgers of multiple devices, and randomly delaying transactions, and study the impact of the proposed methods on attack success. Our results show that attacks in the baseline approach can correctly classify over 90% of devices in the ledger, while the timestamp obfuscation methods can reduce attack success rates to between 20-30%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the related works. Details of activity privacy in blockchain is outlined in Section III. Evaluation results are presented in Section IV. Section V presents discussions and concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Blockchain transactions are cryptographically sealed using public/private keys. The Public Key (PK) used in each transaction is employed as the identity of the transaction generator, that introduces a level of anonymity for the blockchain users. To enhance their anonymity, the users may change their PK for each new transaction as in Bitcoin [8] . This protects users against linking attacks, where malicious nodes attempt to deanonymize a user by tracking multiple identities of the user. Studies show user deanonymization is still possible using blockchain and off-the-chain information [4] , i.e., other publicly available information in the Internet. The authors in [4] cluster blockchain addresses based on not only the blockchain transactions, but also the available off-the-chain data, e.g., the instances where the PK is mentioned along with a tag that can be a company name. The numerical results show that the proposed method can successfully classify the transactions with higher rate compared to methods that are only based on the blockchain information.
Mixing services can be used to enhance user privacy [2] . A central node, known as mixer, changes the identity of the user coin with a randomly chosen identity to break the link between the users identities and thus protect their privacy. However, classifying multiple transactions of a user is still possible as proved by the authors in [5] .
The classification of transactions of the blockchain is largely studied in Bitcoin. However, in recent years a wide range of blockchain applications in IoT have emerged due to its salient features. Thus, it is critical to study the anonymity of the blockchain in such systems. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to analyze the vulnerability of blockchain to classify device identification in IoT. Device classification in blockchain-based IoT leads to further privacy concerns. Thus, in the rest of the paper we consider device classification for IoT as an attack against user anonymity.
III. ACTIVITY PRIVACY OF BLOCKCHAIN IN IOT
In this section we discuss the implementation setting, attack model, and different timestamp obfuscation methods to study the device type identification risk in blockchain-based IoT.
A. Blockchain setup
We use the smart home traffic dataset available at [1] that is gathered from a real-world deployment of smart home IoT devices. The dataset contains the network traffic of 30 IoT devices for a period of two weeks. The blockchain is populated with transactions corresponding to the communications of IoT devices in the dataset. It is assumed that devices change their PK for each transaction generated in the network, which achieves a level of anonymity. To focus on the vulnerability of stored transactions to sensor type classification, we intentionally abstract out the following aspects of the network traffic and the blockchain: (a) the network management traffic from the dataset, as we assume that attackers only have access to the stored ledger; (b) the consensus algorithm, as the temporal patterns of the transactions are independent of the consensus algorithm. The structure of each transaction is as follows:
Where T ID is the unique identifier of the transaction which is the hash of the transaction content. P.T ID is the identity of the previous transaction in the same ledger which potentially prevents against Sybil attack. timestamp is the time that each transaction is generated and corresponds to the time that the packets are generated in the database. Output is the hash of the PK that the device will use in the next transaction. The last two fields are the PK of the transaction generator and its corresponding signature. The transactions follow the same timestamps as the communications in the dataset. Once the blockchain is populated, we apply machine learning algorithms to identify devices based on different attack models.
B. Attack Model
The attacker first trains the machine learning algorithm on a local network, referred to as testnet in the rest of the paper. The attacker can determine the number and exact type (manufacturer) of devices used in a smart home, and aims to map its known device list to specific PKs in order to infer the user's activities. Thus, we refer to this attack as informed attack. We model an informed attacker by using a 10-fold cross validation analysis, where the training process always ensures that the entire range of sensor devices in the home are represented in the trained algorithms.
C. Timestamp Obfuscation
In this section, we discuss different timestamp obfuscation methods. By looking at the timestamp of the transactions for each device, the attacker can easily identify patterns for more than half the devices of our sample. These patterns make it possible to classify observed transactions and identify which device generated them.
We compare timestamp obfuscation methods with a baseline approach where a transaction is generated for each single packet in the dataset of a device. Our first obfuscation method introduces a random delay for each transaction. More specifically, the transaction corresponding to communication 'c' is generated within the period of [t c , t c+ MaxDelay ], where t c is the time that a communication occurs, and MaxDelay is the maximum possible delay defined by the user. This method changes the pattern of transactions stored in the blockchain and increases the complexity of classifying transactions. The random delay is generated independently for each transaction, so the transaction ordering may also change.
In the baseline implementation all transactions of the same source are assigned to the same ledger. The distribution of the devices amongst the ledgers has a significant impact on the overall privacy as it links different transactions together. If all transactions of the same device are chained together, changing the PK per transaction will not affect the anonymity of the user as clearly all transactions in a ledger belong to the same user. Thus, in the second proposed obfuscation method, called multi-node ledgers, a single ledger is shared for storing transactions among multiple devices. This potentially protects against the attacker that evaluates the transactions of a ledger to infer the pattern of transactions and thus contributes to safeguarding device types.
IoT devices sometimes send data in bulk, for instance, when reporting highly relevant events. Large data payloads are fragmented into multiple packets that are transmitted within a short timeframe. An attacker can exploit payload fragmentation by observing the stream of packets to infer the device type. Therefore, our third measure for data obfuscation creates multi-packet transactions, where we combine multiple packets from the same sender into one transaction. This can also be considered as summarizing all the communications in a single transaction. This timestamp obfuscation method reduces the likelihood of device type classification as: i) the volume of available data for the attacker decreases, ii) the pattern of transactions will not match with pattern of communications by the device which increases the difficulty of classifying the transactions.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our three timestamp obfuscation methods through experiments on the empirical smart home dataset. For each measure, we synthetically create transactions based on the packet traces and then evaluate an attacker's ability to correctly classify the devices in the trace. We first evaluate these measures individually, then combine them to understand their cumulative benefits.
1) Delayed transactions: Considering the observed characteristic separation times observed in the devices' patterns, we introduce random delays generated in intervals of [0, 0.5], [0, 2] and [0, 30] seconds respectively. The time separating two successive transactions of the same device is less regular, and the previously identified patterns are at least partly disturbed. Figure 1 shows the results for delayed transactions. Applying any of these random delays decreases the accuracy of the classification by more than 15% for the informed attacker model. There is only a small difference between the results obtained for experiments with the [0, 0.5] and [0, 2] intervals. This can be explained by the fact that examining the patterns of the devices, the recognisable times are either < 0.4 seconds or ≥ 28 seconds. Testing two different delays in this interval has close results, as it wouldn't disturb the patterns. A delay of about 30 seconds creates a significant step of 30 seconds of separation, and makes it harder to identify patterns and to classify the transactions.
2) Multi-device ledgers: To see the impact of the number of devices per ledger, we randomly assign devices to a common ledger and classify their combined transactions, while varying the number of devices per ledger. Figure 1b shows the results. Multi-node ledgers significantly reduce attack success rates from nearly 98% for single node ledgers to around 50% for ledgers with 17 nodes. When a small number of devices are pooled together, it is easier to differentiate the transactions' origins when we already know their behaviour, as they each have their own distinct temporal patterns. In contrast, including transactions from a larger number of devices in a ledger convolves inter-transaction times across devices, which is further accentuated when two devices have similar transaction temporal patterns. It also becomes harder to infer patterns based on the separation times, as two back-to-back transactions are less likely to originate from the same device if we increase the number of devices included (and therefore the total number of transactions).
3) Multi-packet transactions: The maximum separation time for two consecutive packets from the same device varies across devices depending on their function. Combining multiple packets into a transaction conceals short separation times which allow us to build recognition models for individual devices. The exact number of packets that are combined together depends on application and the total number of packets generated by the device. Figure 2 shows the results. Multi-packet transactions decrease the classification accuracy by about 20% on average. The attacker has clear understanding of the transaction patterns and thus uses short separation times to discriminate a device from another. By consolidating multiple packets to a single transaction and thus removing the separation time, the rate of correct identification is reduced.
4) Combined Timestamp Obfuscation:
We have seen that all the timestamp obfuscation methods, applied separately, increase resilience against device identification compared to the baseline case. Noting that the percentage of correctly classified transactions should be around 5% for a strategy that randomly picks a device from the set (for our experimental set of 20 devices) we now evaluate the effects of combining our obfuscation measures. We first combine multi-packet transactions with multi-node ledgers, and report the results in Figure 2b . This combination improves the privacy by about 10%, as the additional concealment of fine-grained temporal features reduces the value of the informed attacker's full visibility into device types.
Next, we combine delayed transactions with multi-packet transactions, and the results are shown in Figure 2c seconds reduces the classification accuracy by 10%, and thus improves the privacy. However, if we compare these results to the ones obtained when using single-packet transactions, we surprisingly notice that the privacy is actually better with delayed single-packet transactions. One reason could be that, in our raw sample, the distribution of the transactions within the different devices is relatively balanced (with roughly comparable numbers of transactions per device). Multi-packet transactions can cause significant changes in the transaction distribution across devices, with some devices becoming more dominant and others becoming scarcely represented. This results in classifiers achieving high performance by simply guessing the more dominant devices all the time. Finally, we compare the impact of combining all three timestamp obfuscation measures, shown in Figure 2d . Multipacket transactions with no delay perform best for ledgers with 1-2 devices. The likely reason is that the delay has diminishing returns on timestamp obfuscation when both multi-packet transactions and multi-node ledgers are in place. However, we note that the results for 1-2 devices are more sensitive to the random selection of devices for each simulation run, due to the dependence on the temporal features of the selected device(s). The lowest classification accuracy is 24% and is achieved when combining three proposed obfuscation measures along with a delay of 30 seconds for generating transactions.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed device classification in IoT-based blockchain which is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to provide such analysis. We show that device identification in blockchain-based IoT introduces privacy concerns. We used a smart home setting as a representative case study of the IoT. We applied machine learning algorithms on the blockchain to classify the devices. The results have demonstrated that the attacks can have up to 90% accuracy in classifying type and number of devices in a smart home. To reduce the success rate of device classification, we proposed three timestamp obfuscation methods such as combining multiple packets into a single transaction, merging ledgers of multiple packets, and randomly delaying transactions. The proposed timestamp obfuscation methods can reduce the success rate to below 30%.
